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ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA: 
RECONCILING RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
Eleanor Singer, Ph.D.* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2003, the National Research Council of the National 
Academy of Sciences established the Panel on Data Access for 
Research Purposes to “assess competing approaches to exploiting 
the research potential of microdata . . . while preserving 
confidentiality.”1 The panel was asked to consider the tradeoffs 
between the risks and benefits of access to research data and to 
make recommendations about “how microdata should optimally 
(from a societal standpoint) be made available to researchers.”2 As 
the panel’s chair, I drew heavily on its final report for this article, 
but the views expressed are my own, not those of the panel or of 
the Academy. 
In the present context, “research data” refers to information 
collected from individuals, households, firms, and other 
organizations for exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge of 
confidentiality. Confidentiality means that the information will not 
be disclosed in identifiable form to an unauthorized party.3 
Examples of information collected exclusively for statistical 
purposes include: (1) the information collected in the decennial 
census; (2) the monthly employment data collected by the U.S. 
Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and (3) the 
                                                          
 * Research Professor, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
1 PANEL ON DATA ACCESS FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, EXPANDING ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA: RECONCILING RISKS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2005) [hereinafter PANEL ON DATA ACCESS]. 
2 Id. 
3 SYS. SEC. STUD. COMMITTEE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT 
RISK: SAFE COMPUTING IN THE INFORMATION AGE 289 (1991). 
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information obtained in the Health Interview Survey, also collected 
by the Census Bureau. The purpose of such data collections is to 
generate information about categories of persons or organizations, 
such as children under the age of 18 or households with only one 
parent present. Although policy decisions based on that 
information may affect individual members of the category, no 
direct action is taken for or against a specific individual or 
organization on the basis of the information collected. 
In contrast to data collected for statistical purposes, 
information gathered for administrative purposes is expressly 
designed to facilitate a course of action affecting a particular 
person or organization.4 Examples of administrative data include 
information required from individuals seeking to obtain a driver’s 
license or to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid. Such data are not 
collected under a pledge of confidentiality,5 and individuals have 
no reasonable expectation of the data’s confidentiality. 
Although administrative data are not the subject of the present 
discussion, they become relevant to it when, as happens 
increasingly often, they are linked to data collected for statistical 
purposes under a pledge of confidentiality. To perform such 
linkages the consent of the individual is ordinarily required, and 
the linked administrative data become subject to the assurance of 
confidentiality provided by the researcher.6 
This article discusses the benefits and potential costs of access 
to research data, ways of reconciling the two, and why it is 
important to do so. I want to stress two main points. First, there are 
competing claims in this arena between those who, for good 
reasons, want easier access to research data, and those who, for 
                                                          
4 “Administrative purposes” may include regulatory, legislative, or judicial 
purposes. PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS, NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES: CONFIDENTIALITY AND 
ACCESSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT STATISTICS 24 (1993) [hereinafter PANEL ON 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS]. 
5 Id. (“[T]he Privacy Act of 1974 defines a statistical record to be[:] a 
record in a system of records maintained for statistical research or reporting 
purposes only and not used in whole or in part in making any determination 
about an identifiable individual.”) (emphasis added). 
6 Cf. infra Part I.B. 
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equally good reasons, are concerned that granting such access risks 
harming not only individuals but the research enterprise itself. 
Increasingly, the courts are going to be asked to adjudicate these 
competing claims. 
The second, and perhaps even more important point, is that 
there are legal, technical, and administrative devices for managing 
the tension between these competing claims. These devices may 
not totally satisfy either privacy advocates or those who want fast 
and free access to detailed information about individuals. But 
given the benefits of both access and confidentiality protection, it 
is important to make optimum use of all available tools. 
Part I of this article provides an example of why issues of data 
access are of interest to judges, and discusses recent legislation 
affecting access to research data. Part II begins with some 
examples of the uses of research data, and then discusses the 
benefits and potential costs of expanded access as well as 
technical, legal, and social changes that have increased the tension 
between benefits and costs. Part III reviews the threats to 
confidentiality posed by expanded access to research data, and 
discusses a variety of technological, legal, and administrative 
solutions. 
I. WHY DATA ACCESS IS OF INTEREST TO JUDGES 
A. Southern Illinoisan v. Department of Public Health 
One reason judges should be concerned with issues of data 
access is the recent Illinois Appellate Court decision, Southern 
Illinoisan v. Department of Public Health.7 The Illinois 
Department of Public Health appealed the Jackson County trial 
court decision, which had ordered the disclosure of certain Illinois 
Cancer Registry (Registry) information to the Southern Illinoisan, 
a newspaper in Carbondale, Illinois, based upon a Freedom of 
                                                          
7 812 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
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Information Act (FOIA) request.8 This was the second appeal from 
the trial court’s decision; in the first, the Appellate Court held that 
the phrase in the Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances 
Registry Act,9 forbidding public inspection or dissemination of any 
group of facts that would tend to identify persons in the Registry, 
referred to any group of facts that “reasonably” would tend to 
identify specific persons.10 
On remand, the district court held hearings to determine if the 
information sought by the newspaper would reasonably tend to 
identify specific persons in the Registry. Latanya Sweeney, a 
professor at Carnegie Mellon University, testified that using only 
the information sought by the plaintiffs in the case—information 
stripped of obvious identifiers like name and address—she was 
able to identify 18 of 20 individuals exactly. She was also able to 
supply two plausible alternative names for each of the remaining 
two individuals.11  
The Appellate Court nevertheless ordered defendants to turn 
over the requested information, affirming the second trial court 
decision. The court found that Dr. Sweeney’s knowledge and 
analytical skill are “beyond that of the average person.”12 Thus, it 
was not reasonable to believe that anyone “with less knowledge, 
education, and experience than Dr. Sweeney”13 would be able to 
identify individuals.14 But this kind of knowledge, while not 
universal, is by no means arcane. Students at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, for example, performed a similar analysis 
for individuals in Chicago’s Homicide Database.15 
                                                          
8 Id. 
9 Illinois Health and Hazardous Substances Registry Act, 410 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 525/(d) (1998). 
10 S. Illinoisan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 747 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001). 
11 S. Illinoisan, 812 N.E.2d at 29. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 30. 
14 Id. 
15 S. OCHAS, ET AL., IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUALS IN CHICAGO’S 
HOMICIDE DATABASE: A TECHNICAL AND LEGAL STUDY (2001) (unpublished 
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B. Recent Federal Legislation Affecting Access To Research 
Data 
Another example of why judges should be interested in the 
issues involved in access to research data is the relatively recent 
passage of a federal law, the Confidential Information Protection 
and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA).16 Subpart A of CIPSEA 
creates equal confidentiality protection for all data collected by 
federal agencies for exclusively statistical purposes under a pledge 
of confidentiality, and it raises the level of protection for many of 
them to that enjoyed previously only by the Census Bureau and the 
National Center for Health Statistics. The law also protects such 
information against FOIA requests. 
The law’s protections also extend to contractual agents of the 
federal agencies, who may be organizations or individual 
researchers. Currently, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) is preparing regulations to implement the safeguards under 
CIPSEA. These regulations are expected to define more precisely 
both the reach of protection for confidential statistical records and 
the opportunities for research access. 
Under CIPSEA, willful disclosure of identifiable information 
collected under a promise of confidentiality may result in a fine of 
$250,000, five years imprisonment, or both. The law’s provisions, 
however, have not yet been tested in court and the extent to which 
they will prevail if they conflict with other laws and interests—for 
example, national security concerns—remains to be seen. 
Several other recently enacted laws—the USA PATRIOT Act 
of 2001 (Patriot Act), the Shelby Amendment, and the Information 
Quality Act—are relevant to the issue of data access.17 
The Patriot Act18 overturned the strict confidentiality 
                                                          
manuscript, on file with the author). 
16 See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). 
17 The implications of an additional statute, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (2000), are beyond the scope 
of this paper. 
18 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 
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protection of education records gathered and maintained by the 
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), a change in 
protection that was later reflected in corresponding amendments to 
the statute governing NCES. The Patriot Act allows the Attorney 
General to petition a court for access to identifiable education 
records, including research records, for use in the investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist activities. 
The Shelby Amendment also permits access to federal research 
information for non-research purposes.19 The Amendment requires 
OMB to set forth regulations to ensure that all data that are 
supported by a federal grant to colleges, universities, hospitals and 
other nonprofit institutions “will be made available to the public 
through procedures established under the [FOIA].”20 The resulting 
OMB guidelines restrict access to published or cited research that 
has been used by the federal government to develop legally 
binding regulations and rulings. The guidelines also provide an 
exemption to access under FOIA for information that would result 
in a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, such as 
records that could be used to identify a particular person in a 
research study.”21 CIPSEA supports the OMB’s interpretation of 
the Amendment because it limits disclosure of confidential 
information under FOIA as well. However, the validity of the 
OMB guidelines and the CIPSEA restrictions have yet to be tested 
through litigation. 
Federal statistical agencies also confront increased scrutiny of 
the quality of information that they disseminate to the public, even 
if the data have not been used as part of the regulatory process. The 
                                                          
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
19 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
20 Id. § 2681-495. 
21 PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 24. For a detailed discussion of 
this issue, see AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ENSURING THE QUALITY OF 
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING THE 
QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKSHOP 
REPORT (2003). 
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Information Quality Act,22 also known as the Data Quality Act, 
directs OMB to issue guidelines for “ensuring and maximizing the 
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information 
disseminated . . . by federal agencies”23 to the public, and requires 
all federal agencies to establish administrative procedures for 
correcting disseminated information that does not meet those 
standards. The resulting OMB guidelines24 define “scientific 
information” to include agency distribution of public use and 
restricted use statistical datasets.25 “Influential scientific 
information,” which is defined as information reasonably expected 
to “have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies 
or important private sector decisions,”26 must meet even higher 
information quality standards. Agencies that disseminate 
influential scientific information must first conduct a peer review 
and reveal enough about the data and methods used to facilitate 
independent reanalysis, while taking into account privacy, 
confidentiality, and intellectual property rights. There is concern 
among some researchers that the Data Quality Act, like the Shelby 
Amendment, may be used by those opposed to certain policy 
initiatives to challenge the findings and quality of research data as 
a means of impeding agency regulatory activities. In 2003, some 
19 federal agencies received data correction requests under the 
Data Quality Act.27 
                                                          
22 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 (commonly known as the 
Information (or Data) Quality Act), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 
2763A-153 (2000). 
23 Id. § 515(a). 
24 See OMB Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 2664-02 (January 14, 2005). 
25 Id. at 2667. 
26 Id. 
27 See Draft 2005 Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations, June 2005, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/draft_ 
2005_cb_report.pdf. 
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II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXPANDED ACCESS TO RESEARCH 
DATA 
A. The Uses of Research Data 
 
It is hard to find a sector of society that does not make use of 
research data in some way. First, of course, there is use by the 
government itself, in its policy-formulating role. Public policies 
often focus on population groups defined in terms of one or more 
characteristics: low-income families, veterans, Medicare patients, 
preschool children, drug addicts, and homeowners, to name a few 
from a long list. Policy design proceeds on the basis of knowing 
how many people there are in these groups; how they are 
geographically distributed; and how they differ in other 
characteristics. For example, how will changing the age of 
eligibility for Social Security affect retirement decisions across 
different occupations and regions of the country? Information 
about the potential impact of such policy changes can influence the 
legislation eventually adopted.28 
Other public policies focus on public and private 
establishments such as public schools, military bases, hospitals, 
prisons, small businesses, health care providers, and financial 
institutions. For establishments, too, complex policy-making 
requires access to complex, multivariate microdata derived from 
large-scale surveys of individuals and establishments. Access to 
microdata—that is, individual-level information, as distinct from 
aggregated summary data—provides the analytic flexibility needed 
for sophisticated policy analysis and planning. At the same time, 
access to microdata, especially microdata linked to administrative 
records, such as Social Security earnings statements or Medicare 
records, increases the probability that the confidentiality of the data 
can be breached.29 
The most important sources of the information used for policy 
design, evaluation, and planning purposes are the more than 70 
                                                          
28 For other examples, see PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1. 
29 Id. 
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federal agencies that carry out statistical activities of at least 
$500,000 per year. In fiscal year 2004, these agencies were 
authorized to spend about $4.8 billion for statistical programs to 
serve the Nation’s informational needs.30 The agencies either 
collect data themselves or, very commonly, contract with survey 
organizations such as Westat or the National Opinion Research 
Center (NORC) to collect the data for them.31 In addition, state 
agencies also collect data needed to carry out state governmental 
functions. 
Social scientists, of course, are heavy producers as well as 
consumers of such data, often with the aid of government grants or 
contracts. Such surveys as the University of Michigan’s Health and 
Retirement Study, a national longitudinal survey of some 12,000 
Americans aged 50 and over, or the NORC’s General Social 
Survey, a cross-sectional national survey of 3,000 Americans 18 
and over, are done under the leadership of social scientists with 
grants from the federal government, and are made available for use 
by the research community and the general public. This last 
statement—that research data are made widely available for 
reanalysis by others—is key to the tension faced by data collection 
agencies. 
B. Benefits of Expanded Access to Research Data 
There are many benefits of increasing access to research data; 
three are discussed below. 
First, primary data collection is increasingly expensive, 
difficult, and burdensome and, thus, sharing data may reduce the 
cost of collecting the information and alleviate some of the burden 
on respondents. Because ours is a mobile society, whose members 
carry out many activities outside the home, individuals are 
                                                          
30 U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2004, p. 7 (2003). 
31 The list of federal agencies that gather data includes: the Census Bureau, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the National Center for Health Statistics, the 
Centers for Disease Control, the National Institute of Drug and Alcohol Use, and 
the National Center for Education Statistics. 
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becoming more difficult to reach and, when reached, they are often 
too busy to answer the researcher’s questions. But because 
interviewing all persons who have been selected for a sample is 
crucial for the validity of survey results, difficulties in reaching 
potential respondents and persuading them to be interviewed mean 
escalating survey costs. 
Furthermore, the kinds of surveys carried out or sponsored by 
government have become longer over time, and often inquire into 
topics, such as health and financial status, that are considered 
sensitive by respondents. As a result, surveys have become more 
burdensome, further increasing their difficulty and cost. Sharing 
research data by giving many researchers access to a single data set 
increases the return on this increased investment. 
Second, there is a benefit from sharing research data that 
accrues to the statistical agencies themselves. When data are 
shared with external researchers along with study results, the 
agencies can improve their own data collection methods and 
analytic capabilities. Faulty techniques that might not otherwise 
have been discovered can be identified, and techniques that are 
effective will be promoted. Researcher access also ensures that 
additional information about statistical procedures, which might 
otherwise not be completely documented by agencies, is archived. 
Third, democratic societies require multiple perspectives 
brought to bear on research data. Facts do not speak for 
themselves. They are interpreted by analysts with different points 
of view and, sometimes, different axes to grind. If access to data is 
limited to those with only one point of view, there is no 
opportunity for a critique of the policies that governments or 
private industries develop. Broader access does not guarantee 
better policy, but it does make possible an informed critique and 
evaluation of whatever policies are adopted and their outcomes. 
The current debate over Social Security is a case in point. 
Competing analyses have produced significantly different 
estimates of when the Social Security trust fund will run out of 
money, how much is required to assure its solvency, and how 
much various proposals, such as taxing incomes over $90,000 or 
raising the retirement age, would contribute to reducing or 
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eliminating the deficit.32 
Finally, science, as well as policy, benefits from replication 
because replication guards against both good-faith error and 
deliberate fraud. It is often impossible, for a variety of reasons, to 
produce a data set identical to one that was used to formulate a 
theory or a practical policy. Because of this, it is essential that 
scientists as well as policy makers have access to the original data 
on which the policies or theories were based in order to replicate 
the analyses that were carried out. Cyril Burt, for example, was 
able to perpetuate his theory of the heritability of intelligence for 
many years because only he had access to the disputed data set of 
53 pairs of identical twins on which he based his claims.33 
C. Potential Costs of Expanded Access to Research Data 
One cost of providing unrestricted access to fully detailed 
microdata is a potential breach of the data’s confidentiality. This 
section considers the various ways in which confidentiality can be 
breached. But first, it is important to consider why confidentiality 
matters. 
Confidentiality matters, in the first place, for the individual. 
Much of the information requested by government statistical 
agencies and their agents is sensitive for a variety of reasons. The 
Health and Retirement Study, for example, obtains detailed 
information from individuals about earnings and assets in order to 
analyze the relationship between health, wealth, and retirement 
decisions, which is the primary aim of the survey. But if the 
information became known to unscrupulous outsiders, it might 
                                                          
32 See, e.g., CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, PROGRESSIVE GUIDE TO 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY DEBATE, http://www.americanprogress.org/site/ 
pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=289148; THE SOCIAL SECURITY NETWORK, A 
CENTURY FOUNDATION PROJECT, http://www.socsec.org/; FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 99-20 (June 25, 1999), 
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-20.html. 
33 J. A. Plucker, Human intelligence: Historical Influences, Current 
Controversies, Teaching Resources (2003), avilable at http://www.indiana. 
edu/~intell (last visited June 16, 2005). 
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make respondents liable to fraud, theft, or other kinds of abuse. 
To take another example, the National Institute for Drug and 
Alcohol conducts detailed surveys of adolescent drug use for 
epidemiological purposes. If adolescents honestly admit the use of 
illegal drugs and if that information became known to law 
enforcement agencies, they would be subject to legal sanctions. 
There are numerous examples but the general point has been made: 
if the information collected in many surveys became publicly 
known, together with identifying information about the 
respondents, respondents would be subject to a variety of harms 
ranging from embarrassment to employment discrimination, 
criminal victimization or imprisonment. A breach of 
confidentiality and its potential consequences, in other words, is 
probably the most serious risk to which participants in social 
research—as opposed to biomedical research—are subject. 
Individual harm, however, is not the only consequence of a 
confidentiality breach—decreased participation in social research 
may also result. Unlike much biomedical research, social research 
depends on the voluntary cooperation of those selected, usually by 
probability sampling methods, to participate. Biomedical 
researchers assume that the individuals they study are homogenous 
enough so that one person can be substituted for another. This is 
not true in social research, where individual variation is precisely 
the object of study.34 If significant elements of the population who 
are designated for measurement refuse to cooperate, the inferences 
drawn from the responses of those who do cooperate are likely to 
be erroneous and misleading. There is evidence from a variety of 
studies, most of them carried out in connection with the U.S. 
decennial census, that public concerns about privacy and 
confidentiality have increased significantly over the last decade,35 
                                                          
34 See, e.g., PANEL ON INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS, SURVEYS, AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING 
PARTICIPANTS AND FACILITATING SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 102 
(2003). 
35 ELEANOR SINGER, US CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 TESTING, 
EXPERIMENTATION, AND EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC REPORT NO. 1, TR-1, 
PRIVACY RESEARCH IN CENSUS 2000 4-7, (2003), available at 
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and that they significantly reduce cooperation. For example, 
concerns about privacy and confidentiality significantly reduced 
participation in the decennial censuses of 1990 and 2000.36 Small-
scale experiments also demonstrate that the likelihood of 
confidentiality breaches is perceived as an important risk by survey 
respondents, and is significantly correlated with their decision 
about whether or not to participate in nongovernmental surveys.37 
This reluctance extends to other behaviors,38 for example, 
providing one’s Social Security Number (SSN).39 Thus, there is 
ample evidence that confidentiality breaches potentially harm both 
the individual and the larger society. 
                                                          
http://www.census.gov/pred/www/rpts/TR-1.pdf. 
36 See Eleanor Singer, et al., The Impact of Privacy and Confidentiality 
Concerns On Survey Participation: The Case of the 1990 Census, 57 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 465 (1993); Eleanor Singer, et al., Attitudes and Behavior: The 
Impact of Privacy and Confidentiality Concerns on Participation in the 2000 
Census, 65 PUB. OPINION Q. 368 (2003); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 2000 
CENSUS: COUNTING UNDER ADVERSITY 2004; S. Hillygus, et al., Civic 
Mobilization and Privacy Concerns in the 2000 Census (2006). 
37 Eleanor Singer, Exploring the Meaning of Consent: Participation in 
Research and Beliefs about Risks and Benefits, 19 J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. 273 
(2003). 
38 N. A. Bates, Development and Testing of Informed Consent Questions to 
Link Survey Data with Administrative Records, AAPOR Annual Conference, 
May 13, 2005. 
39 Census Bureau efforts to obtain SSNs have become increasingly difficult 
over the last few years. For example, in the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), SSN refusals increased from 12 percent to 35 percent 
between the 1996 and 2001 panels, respectively. Email from Donna Ricinni, 
Chief Income Surveys Programming Branch, U.S. Census Bureau to N. Bates 
(Jan. 23, 2003) (on file with author); D. LEWIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FINAL 
PROJECT REPORT FOR IMPROVING SOCIAL SECURITY NU,MBER RESPONSE 
STUDY, 2005 (on file with author). SSN refusals in the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) increased from approximately ten percent in 1994 to almost 23 
percent by 2003. R. TUCKER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RECENT CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEYS AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER REPORTING 
EXPERIENCE, 1999; T. MARSHALL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RECENT CURRENT 
POPULATION SURVEYS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER REPORTING EXPERIENCE, 
2004 (on file with author). 
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D. Technical, Legal and Social Changes That Have Increased 
the Tension 
The tension between access and confidentiality is not new. In 
1985, a National Research Council (NRC) Panel issued a report 
that focused primarily on the benefits of access.40 In 1993, another 
NRC Panel issued a comprehensive report titled Private Lives and 
Public Policies, which explicitly examined the various tensions 
involved in making research data more widely available while 
maintaining their confidentiality.41 Why, then, take another look at 
the problem now? The reasons lie in the substantial changes, 
primarily technological but also legal and social, that have taken 
place in the last decade. 
Undergirding all the other changes are the vast increases in 
computing power and storage capacity that have taken place. The 
information world now captures enormous numbers of records of 
personal and organizational information, stores them in data 
warehouses, analyzes them through sophisticated statistical and 
data mining techniques, and disseminates the results 
instantaneously through electronic communications media. The 
explosion in information technology is evident at each stage of the 
process of data capture, storage, integration, and dissemination, 
and can be measured by the reduced cost of each of these 
activities. For example, the NRC noted in 2005: 
[O]ne terabyte of storage can hold the contents of 2,000 file 
cabinets of documents. Ten years ago, such storage would 
have cost $1 million; now it can be obtained for less than 
$800. . . . Data integration—that is, consolidating 
information from heterogeneous databases—is no longer a 
horrendously complex task, but one that is facilitated by 
data standards (such as XML), the growth of the Web, and 
fast and inexpensive data transmission capability. 
Correspondingly, data dissemination through the Web and 
                                                          
40 COMMITTEE ON NAT’L STAT., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING 
RESEARCH DATA (1985). 
41 PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND DATA ACCESS, supra note 4. 
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electronic mail is now free for all practical purposes.42 
Such decreased costs benefit legitimate researchers, but they 
also provide opportunities for “data snoopers”—individuals or 
organizations that seek to identify individual respondents for a 
variety of purposes that include curiosity, mischief, and marketing 
as well as searching for criminals or terrorists. Data that are most 
useful to legitimate researchers also have properties that make 
individuals especially vulnerable to data snoopers (examples of 
such data include detailed geographic information, repeated data 
collections from the same subjects, and complete censuses rather 
than small probability samples). All of these properties make it 
easier to identify individuals even in a data file from which direct 
identifiers, such as names and addresses, have been removed. 
The second change is the development of new ways of 
collecting information about individuals. For example, the use of 
scanners at supermarkets permits stores to collect and share a 
wealth of information about purchasing behavior and to link that to 
the information provided on consumers’ credit applications and to 
census data for small areas. The use of keycards in businesses and 
government offices enables employers to track employee 
movements precisely.43 So-called “black boxes” in new model 
automobiles record and store information on seat belt use and 
speed, but buyers are not always aware of these features.44 Other 
kinds of information, such as biomarkers for various diseases and 
even unique genetic information, are increasingly collected as part 
of social surveys that also inquire into many details of individuals’ 
                                                          
42 See PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1. See also George T. Duncan, 
Exploring the Tension Between Privacy and the Social Benefits of Governmental 
Databases, in A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE: PRIVACY, SECURITY AND PUBLIC 
INFORMATION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 72 (Peter. M. Shane et al. eds., 2004) 
(stating that “advances in information technology have sharply lowered the costs 
of data capture, storage, integration and dissemination”). 
43 EDWARD BALKOVICH, TORA K. BIKSON & GORDON BITKO, 9 TO 5: DO 
YOU KNOW IF YOUR BOSS KNOWS WHERE YOU ARE? 11 (RAND 2005) 
(discussing the use of Radio Frequency Identification access cards in the 
workplace). 
44 N.D. Bismarck, States Seek to Regulate ‘Black Boxes’ in Autos, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at 16. 
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behavior.45 
A great deal of care and thought is needed when such data are 
released. For example, a map pinpointing the location of sample 
members can, potentially, serve to identify those individuals; 
knowing who is in the sample, in turn, greatly increases the ability 
of intruders to locate those records in the data file, and thus to learn 
things about them that the individual believed were available only 
to the researchers. 
The third change is the existence and increasing availability of 
large databases containing information on hundreds of thousands, 
sometimes millions, of individuals.46 These databases—such as 
those maintained by Experian,47 for example—contain names and 
addresses, and sometimes Social Security Numbers, as well as 
information on a wide variety of individual characteristics, such as 
income, education, race, marital status, and much more. Together 
with sophisticated software for matching records electronically, 
these databases provide the tools for matching data records from 
which direct identifiers have been removed with other records that 
have some identical data elements along with the direct identifiers. 
This is essentially the method Dr. Sweeney used in the Illinois 
Cancer Registry case discussed earlier.48 Among the technical 
changes, too, are new ways of disguising data to maintain their 
confidentiality, such as masking and multiple imputation, which 
are discussed in a later section. 
The final two developments that have increased the tension 
between increasing access to research data and protecting 
confidentiality have already been discussed. Changes in the legal 
framework have placed a greater strain on the research system by 
increasing the risk of confidentiality breaches (e.g., Patriot Act, 
                                                          
45 PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 60. 
46 Latanya Sweeney, Information Explosion, in CONFIDENTIALITY, 
DISCLOSURE, AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR 
STATISTICAL AGENCIES 43 (P. Doyle et al. eds., 2001). 
47 Experian, a credit bureau, maintains credit information on approximately 
215 million U.S. consumers. See Experian Corporate Fact Sheet, 
http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2005). 
48 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
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Shelby Amendment, and Data Quality Act) while simultaneously 
increasing confidentiality protections (e.g., CIPSEA). Furthermore, 
increased public concerns about privacy and confidentiality have 
led to an increased reluctance to participate in statistical surveys or 
to provide Social Security Numbers, which are often used to link 
data from several surveys or to combine information from a survey 
and administrative records. 
III. PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY 
A variety of threats to the confidentiality of research data exist. 
Probably the most common is simple carelessness—not removing 
names, addresses, or telephone numbers from questionnaires or 
electronic data files, leaving cabinets unlocked, or not encrypting 
files containing identifying information. Increased access to 
research data is likely to heighten the risks stemming from 
carelessness and ignorance unless adequate precautions are taken. 
Less common but potentially more serious threats to 
confidentiality are legal demands for identified data, either in the 
form of a subpoena or as a result of a FOIA request. Also of 
concern are instances of intrusion into government statistics by 
other government agencies for law enforcement purposes. 
Anderson and Seltzer, for example, have recently documented a 
number of attempts to use Census Bureau data for such purposes 
between 1910 and 1965.49 
In addition to the legal attempts to obtain confidential 
information described above, confidentiality may also be breached 
as a result of illegal intrusions into the data. Such instances of 
identity theft have become more prominent in the news in the last 
ten years. For example, in 2005, the ChoicePoint Corporation, a 
data warehouse, was duped by thieves posing as businessmen into 
                                                          
49 See Margo Anderson & William Seltzer, The Challenges of “Taxation, 
Investigation, and Regulation:” Statistical Confidentiality and U.S. Federal 
Statistics, 1910-1965 (2004) (paper prepared for Census Bureau Symposium, 
America’s Scorecard: The Historic Role of the Census in an Ever-Changing 
Nation, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, March 4-5, 2004), 
available at http://www.uwm.edu/~margo/govstat/Challenges.pdf. 
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selling hundreds of thousands of confidential records containing 
sensitive personal information. 
A final threat to data confidentiality is the possibility of 
“statistical disclosure,” which refers to the re-identification of 
individuals (or their attributes) as a result of an outsider’s matching 
of survey data that has been stripped of explicit identifying 
information, such as names and addresses, with information 
available outside the survey. Although there are no known 
instances of the confidentiality of research data having been 
breached as a result of statistical disclosure, this is the risk that 
government data collection agencies and other survey 
organizations are currently most concerned about, and they are 
increasingly taking steps to protect against this possibility. 
What can researchers do to protect data confidentiality against 
these threats? We discuss this under three headings: Development 
of norms and best practices; protections against legal intrusions; 
and protections against illegal intrusions. 
A. Development of Norms and Best Practices 
As noted above, the most likely reason for a breach of 
confidentiality involving research data is ignorance or carelessness. 
Laws and procedures designed to prevent confidentiality breaches 
and punish their occurrence are not enough to combat breaches 
caused by carelessness; they must be accompanied by internalized 
norms of research ethics and fair information practices, as well as 
practical knowledge of how to implement such policies.50 The 
Panel on Data Access for Research Purposes has made three 
specific recommendations in this area: 51 
Rec. 16: Statistical agencies and survey organizations that 
collect individually identifiable data should provide written 
guidelines for confidentiality protection and training in 
confidentiality practices and data management that guard 
                                                          
50 For some practical suggestions along these lines, see R. M GROVES, ET 
AL., SURVEY METHODOLOGY, 358-59, 368-70 (2004). 
51 PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 82-84. 
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against disclosure for all staff who work with or have 
access to such data. 
Rec. 18: Training in ethical issues related to research, 
including fair information practices, as well as principles 
and practices related to research with human subjects, 
should be part of the professional training of all those 
involved in the design, collection, distribution, and use of 
data obtained under pledges of confidentiality. Such 
training should be updated at intervals after the end of 
formal schooling. 
Rec. 19: Professional associations should develop strong 
codes of ethical conduct that reflect the need to protect the 
confidentiality of personal data and make adherence to 
these codes an integral part of their educational activities. 
B. Protections Against Legal Intrusions 
An example of a legal intrusion into research data is a 
subpoena in a legal proceeding. Contingent valuation surveys, for 
example, value a public good, such as clean air or clean water, by 
asking respondents what they would be willing to pay for it. Such 
surveys are sometimes done in order to establish the damages that 
should be assessed in a man-made disaster, as in the case of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. Defendants in such cases have an interest 
in making sure that the survey was properly done, that the 
interviews were actually conducted, and that no distortions took 
place in the reporting of the results. At times, they have 
subpoenaed the actual survey records.52 In one instance, the case 
was settled before the data were to be produced; in two other 
instances, the courts ordered the researchers to turn over raw data, 
including respondent identifiers, to the defendants.53 Stanley 
                                                          
52 For a review of several such cases, see Stanley Presser, Informed 
Consent and Confidentiality in Survey Research, 58 PUB. OPINION Q. 446, 446-
59 (1994). 
53 Eliot Marshall, Court Orders ‘Sharing’ of Data Science, SCIENCE, July 
16, 1993, at 284-86. 
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Presser, in his article Informed Consent and Confidentiality in 
Survey Research, discusses several actions that might be taken by 
professional survey organizations, such as the American 
Association for Public Opinion Research, to enhance protections of 
confidentiality in such cases—for example, mandating the 
destruction of identifiers in surveys designed for adversarial 
proceedings.54 Another possibility is to verify the procedures used 
without disclosing the identity of the respondents, for example by 
allowing a disinterested survey expert to examine the interviews 
and the procedures to make sure that they meet professional 
standards. 
FOIA requests are another source of legal intrusions into the 
data; an example of this is the case of the Illinois Cancer Registry, 
previously discussed. 55 
At times, law enforcement agencies have requested data 
collected under a promise of confidentiality by another agency. In 
1917, for example, the Department of the Army asked the Census 
Bureau for information about men between the ages of 21 and 30 
who were suspected of not having registered for the recently 
instituted draft. After a ruling by the Census Bureau’s Solicitor 
General, the names of several hundred young men were turned 
over to the courts, draft boards, and the Justice Department by the 
Census Bureau, despite President Taft’s proclamation of 
confidentiality prior to the decennial census.56 In 1947, the 
                                                          
54 For discussion on applicable judicial requirements, see Presser, supra 
note 52. 
55 S. Illinoisan v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 812 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 
See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
56 Anderson & Seltzer, supra note 49. As Anderson and Seltzer tell the 
story: 
[O]fficials in the Provost Marshal General’s office and the local draft 
boards wrestled with administrative procedures to counter resistance to 
the draft registration and the draft. It soon became clear that the returns 
from the 1910 census could provide information to confirm the names, 
addresses and ages of individuals who might be suspected of not 
complying with the draft registration. The possibility of such requests 
frames the conflict between the commitment in Taft’s proclamation [of 
confidentiality] and the requirements of modern war. Why should one 
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Attorney General made a similar request for information about 
suspected Communist sympathizers, but was denied.57 
Two main defenses exist in law against the kinds of legal 
intrusions discussed above: Certificates of Confidentiality, and the 
recently enacted Confidential Information Protection and 
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002. 
Certificates of Confidentiality are issued prospectively by the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to 
                                                          
agency of government prevent another agency of government from 
doing its job? Why shouldn’t the individual level data be made 
available to aid the war effort? 
 However, in seeking to supply such information, the Census 
Director, Sam Rogers, knew he faced an obstacle. On June 22, 1917 he 
asked for guidance from the Secretary of Commerce and explained: 
I have received numerous requests from registration officials in 
various parts of the United States to furnish them with information 
from the census records, showing the ages of men who they 
believe have failed to registered, although between the ages of 21 
and 30. 
He also knew that Taft’s proclamation guaranteed the individual data 
would not be used for enforcement purposes. Nevertheless, he saw a 
higher standard that outweighed the earlier pledge: 
I believe that every branch of the Government, including this 
bureau, should assist at the present time, so far as possible, in 
securing a full registration. Accordingly, it is recommended that 
the matter be taken up with the President, with the view to having 
an order issued waiving the rigid rule laid down in Ex-President 
Taft’s proclamation, and authorizing this Bureau to supply the 
proper officials (both registration and Federal) who are in control 
of the registration and prosecution of individuals who have failed 
to register, with data from the census schedules, which may show 
the ages of such individuals. 
On June 25, the Commerce Department Acting Solicitor issued the 
requested opinion. It gave the Census Director the authority to provide 
names and ages to the registration authorities . . . . Vincent Barabba 
noted in the 1970s that as a result of this opinion “personal information 
for several hundred young men was released to courts, draft boards, and 
the Justice Department.” 
Id. at 7-8. 
57 Id. at 29. 
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researchers on sensitive topics, such as sexual behavior or illegal 
drug use, whether federally funded or not.58 They may also be 
issued by the National Institute of Justice for research supported by 
the Department of Justice. Under a Certificate of Confidentiality, a 
researcher may not be compelled “in any Federal, State, or local 
civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceedings to 
identify . . . the names or other identifying characteristics” of 
research participants.59 The Certificate protects the identity of the 
respondents, not the data themselves. To the best of my 
knowledge, however, the effectiveness of a Certificate of 
Confidentiality has not been tested in the courts. 
The other main legal protection for confidential information, 
CIPSEA,60 has already been discussed. It is rooted in the 
distinction between administrative and statistical uses of data, and 
it protects information collected by statistical agencies or their 
agents under a pledge of confidentiality for exclusively statistical 
purposes from being disclosed in identifiable form except with the 
permission of the respondent.61 Like the Certificate of 
Confidentiality, however, this law has not been tested in the courts. 
C. Protections Against Illegal Intrusions 
Identity Theft. The most visible example of illegal intrusions, 
by far, is identity theft, estimated in one survey to have affected 
more than 11 million Americans in 2003.62 For example, as 
previously mentioned, confidential records at ChoicePoint, a data 
broker, were recently sold to thieves posing as legitimate 
businessmen. LexisNexis, another data broker, suffered similar 
                                                          
58 Public Health Service Act § 301(d), 42 U.S.C. § 241(d), as amended by 
Pub. L. No. 100-607, sec. 163 (1988). 
59 Effect of Confidentiality Certificate, 42 CFR § 2a.7 (2006). 
60 See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006). See supra note 
16 and accompanying text. 
61 See E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).  
62 Diane Hirte, Identity Theft Numbers are Skyrocketing, SHESHUNOFF.COM 
(Feb. 2003), at http://www.sheshunoff.com/email/archive/ 
0203/oper_new1.html. 
SINGER MACROED.DOC 4/6/2006 2:30 PM 
 ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA 107 
 
losses when thieves stole legitimate passwords and login names. 
ChoicePoint estimated that approximately 145,000 U.S. customers’ 
files were compromised, and CBS News reported on March 5, 
2005, that at least 750 people were defrauded as a result. 
LexisNexis said information on 32,000 U.S. customers was 
stolen.63 Bank of America disclosed in February 2005 that it lost 
data tapes containing the Social Security Numbers and home 
addresses of the holders of 1.2 million government charge card 
accounts, and more recently Citibank “lost” data tapes containing 
similar information for some 3.9 million card holders when the 
tapes disappeared during transfer by UPS to a secure storage site.64 
A few days later, Mastercard International reported that more than 
40 million credit card accounts of all brands might have been 
exposed to fraud through a computer security breach at a payment 
processing center.65 
Improper Disclosure. Less visible, but equally disturbing, is 
the improper release of confidential data. For example, in a 1993 
Harris telephone survey, 27% of respondents said that medical 
information about them had been improperly disclosed.66 A recent 
Harris survey reported that only 14% of the sample gave the same 
response in 2005,67 but drastic changes in the mode of the survey 
and the sample make comparison difficult. 
In terms of the number of people whose confidential 
information was improperly disclosed, two airlines—Jet Blue and 
                                                          
63 Paul Roberts, Hackers Grab LexisNexis Info on 32,000 People, PC 
WORLD (March 9, 2005), available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/ 
0,aid,119953,00.asp. 
64 CNN MONEY, Info on 3.9M Citigroup Customers Lost (June 6, 2005) 
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/06/news/fortune500/security_citigroup. 
65 Eric Dash & Tom Zeller, Jr., Mastercard Says 40 Million Files Are Put 
at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1. 
66 Eleanor Singer, et al., Privacy of Health Care Data: What Does the 
Public Know? How Much Do They Care?, in HEALTH CARE AND INFORMATION 
ETHICS 401 (Audrey Chapman, ed., 1997). 
67 PRIVACY & AMERICAN BUSINESS, Conference (testimony of Dr. Alan F. 
Westin, Director of the Program on Information Technology, speaking on 
Privacy and Health Information Technology), Washington, D.C. (Feb. 23, 
2004), http://www.pandab.org/WestinHHS.ppt#342,5ImproperDisclosureof. 
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Northwest—probably get the prize. In violation of their privacy 
policies, the two airlines disclosed confidential information, 
including names, addresses, and Social Security Numbers 
belonging to millions of their passengers, in order to help the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Pentagon 
develop systems designed to profile potential terrorists. The 
systems were subsequently said to have been abandoned because 
of privacy concerns.68 In March, 2005, the Inspector General of the 
Department of Homeland Security blamed the Transportation 
Security Administration for failing to monitor adequately at least 
six airlines’ transfer of sensitive passenger information to private 
companies and federal agencies in 2002 and 2003.69 
Because none of these examples of illegal intrusion or 
improper disclosure involve research data, the concern shown by 
researchers and statistical agencies for protecting confidentiality 
may seem excessive. Nevertheless, the visibility of security 
breaches and other violations of privacy policies in the private 
sector have made the public more skittish about cooperating in 
legitimate research. Hence, government and academic researchers, 
who are dependent on the public’s voluntary cooperation, take the 
protection of confidential data very seriously.  
There are two main ways of protecting research data against 
illegal intrusion: one is to restrict the data—that is, to limit the 
detail of the information that is released in order to reduce its 
identifiability. The other is to restrict access to data whose original 
detail has not been altered. Neither of these, of course, protects 
against the other sources of confidentiality breaches discussed 
above: carelessness, legal intrusions, and improper disclosure. And 
so ironically, the very steps statistical agencies and other data 
collection organizations can take to protect confidentiality—which 
have the unintended consequence of making access to research 
data by legitimate researchers more difficult—are unlikely to 
                                                          
68 Sara Kehaulani Goo, Confidential Data Used for Air Security Project, 
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 17, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/ac2/wp-dyn/A26037-2004Jan17?language=printer. 
69 Eric Lipton, Agency Partly to Blame in Misuse of Passenger Data, 
Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at 14. 
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reduce the confidentiality breaches that are known to occur most 
often. 
1. Restricting Data 
The first step in restricting data is to remove obvious 
identifiers—names, addresses, telephone numbers, Social Security 
numbers and any other information that uniquely identifies an 
individual. But removal of obvious identifiers is only the first step 
in what has come to be known as a “disclosure limitation” 
review.70 
A review of data for purposes of disclosure limitation aims to 
eliminate from the data file those records with unique values on 
variables, as well as those with values that occur very infrequently. 
For example, a black female judge between the ages of 40 and 45 
in Pinellas County, Florida would be readily identifiable in a 
survey even if her name and address were not part of the data 
record. More generally, date of birth, together with relatively small 
geography (such as county) and gender, is often enough to make 
identification possible if the data are matched against publicly 
available electronic files that contain names and addresses.71 Such 
identifications are even easier if the intruder knows that the person 
is actually a part of the sample. Hence, date of birth and small area 
identifiers are routinely removed from data files intended for 
public release. 
In addition to removal of direct identifiers, there are two main 
techniques for restricting data. One of these is called data masking; 
the other uses statistical techniques to create synthetic data that 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY, 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, WORKING 
PAPER 22: REPORT ON STATISTICAL DISCLOSURE LIMITATION METHODOLOGY 
(1994). 
71 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP ON 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS 36 (National 
Academy Press 2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/itr_federal_stats/ 
ch2.html. 
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retain most of the properties of the original data set.72 
Data Masking. The goal of data masking is to reduce the 
number of low-frequency cases in a data set (e.g., people earning 
more than $250,000 a year) and/or to create ambiguity about them. 
There are many ways of masking data. All of them make 
identification more difficult but also reduce the usefulness of the 
information disseminated. A general framework for analyzing the 
joint impact of various disclosure limitation techniques on 
disclosure risk and data utility is the risk-utility (R-U) 
confidentiality map,73 which incorporates quantified measures of 
disclosure risk as well as measures of data utility.74 More research, 
however, is needed on how to optimize the disclosure limitation-
utility tradeoffs. Synthetic Data. The second technique for 
restricting data is to create an alternative data set by statistically 
modeling the original data records. In the most extreme version, 
none of the new records correspond to a real individual, and in that 
sense the statistically modeled “synthetic” data provide complete 
protection for confidential information, although they do not 
necessarily prevent an intruder from believing that he or she has 
identified a real person.75 
Research on synthetic data creation and modeling is proceeding 
                                                          
72 For excellent discussions of both of these techniques, see P. DOYLE, ET 
AL., CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES (2001); Special Issue: 
Disclosure Limitation Methods for Protecting the Confidentiality of Statistical 
Data 14, J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. (Stephen E. Fienberg & Leon C. R. J. 
Willenborg, eds., 1998). See also Jerome P. Reiter, New Approaches to Data 
Dissemination: A Glimpse into the Future?, 17 CHANCE 12 (2004). 
73 G.T. Duncan, et al., Disclosure Risk vs. Data Utility through the R-U 
Confidentiality Map in Multivariate Settings 1-2 (Working paper, 2003), 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/wpapers/retrievePDF?id=2005-16. 
74 See G.T. Duncan & D. Lambert, Disclosure-Limited Data 
Dissemination, 81 J. OF THE AM. STAT. ASS’N 10 (1986); G.T. Duncan & D. 
Lambert, The Risk of Disclosure for Microdata, 7 J. OF BUS. & ECON. STAT., 207 
(1989); D. Lambert, Measures of Disclosure Risk and Harm, 9 J. OF OFFICIAL 
STAT. 313 (1993). 
75 D.B. Rubin, Statistical Disclosure Limitation, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 461 
(1993); T.E. Raghunathan, et al., Multiple Imputation for Statistical Disclosure 
Limitation, 19 J. OF OFFICIAL STAT. 1 (2003); Reiter, supra note 72. 
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rapidly. Researchers are interested in relationships among variables 
or attributes, not the identity of individuals who happen to exhibit 
those attributes. At present, synthetic data are capable of 
reproducing many of the relationships between data elements in 
the original observations—for example, those between education 
and occupation or education and income. But higher-order 
interactions—for example, among race, gender, education, and 
income—are modeled with less accuracy and precision. To 
improve the ability of synthetic data to reproduce accurately these 
complex relationships among variables, researchers are 
experimenting with imputing only some, rather than all, of the 
variables in the original data set. Understandably, such partially 
synthetic data sets are also subject to some, albeit small, disclosure 
risk.76 To date, various studies of the usefulness of simulated data 
suggest that it is a promising approach for various kinds of 
inferential analysis.77 
One advantage of synthetic data over data masking methods is 
their potential for estimating various sources of error. Some true 
relationship exists in the population between, say, education and 
income. The observed relationship in a given sample is just one 
random sample from that population distribution. Synthetic data 
created from the observed data can be thought of as simply another 
random sample from the population. Therefore, as Reiter puts it, 
“the user analyzing these synthetic samples is essentially analyzing 
alternative samples from the population,”78 and the synthetic data 
on average will have similar characteristics as the observed data. 
Because this is true on average, and not for any particular synthetic 
data set, researchers using such data must use multiple data sets 
(hence, “multiple imputation”) both to estimate the true values of 
the variables of interest and—equally important—to estimate the 
                                                          
76 Reiter, supra note 72, at 16. 
77 See, e.g., J.M. Abowd & S.D. Woodcock, Disclosure Limitation in 
Longitudinal Linked Data, in CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, AND DATA 
ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES 
215-78 (Pat Doyle et al. eds., 2001). 
78 Reiter, supra note 72, at 15. 
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sources of error associated with them.79 
2. Restricting Access 
To cope with the loss of accuracy and precision that results 
from masking and imputation, research data are also made 
available in a variety of modes that retain the original identifying 
detail but restrict access to those who can meet certain criteria. 
Some of the ways in which confidential data are made available 
are (1) in special research data centers, to which researchers must 
travel;80 (2) through licensing agreements, which permit access in 
the researcher’s home institution;81 and (3) through remote 
electronic access.82 All of these modes of access stipulate that the 
researcher must meet certain requirements, which vary in their 
stringency. Most of these alternatives require approved research 
plans and license agreements, which permit researchers to work 
with the data at their own institution, require a data protection plan 
and, ordinarily, an agreement to permit auditing the researcher’s 
adherence to this plan. Research data centers and remote access 
involve scrutiny of researchers’ output for possible breaches of 
data confidentiality. All access modes require researchers to sign a 
confidentiality agreement, and they all entail penalties for the 
willful violation of such an agreement. NCES, for example, 
imposes a fine up to $250,000 and/or five years imprisonment for 
such a violation (a Class E felony), as does CIPSEA. The Health 
and Retirement Study’s penalties for willful disclosure include 
                                                          
79 See Reiter, supra note 72, at 15; Raghunathan, supra note 75, at 2-3. 
80 For example, the Census Bureau currently sponsors eight Research Data 
Centers (RDCs), with a ninth scheduled to open in late 2005. The National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and the Agency for Health Research and 
Quality each maintain one RDC, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
maintains three. PANEL ON DATA ACCESS, supra note 1, at 29. 
81 Licensing was first established in 1989 by the NCES. Id. at 33. Other 
agencies that have licensing procedures include BLS and the Division of 
Science Resources Statistics of the National Science Foundation. Id. 
82 Monitored remote access is currently implemented in four federal 
statistical agencies: NCES, NCHS, the Census Bureau, and the Economic 
Research Service in the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 31. 
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forfeiture by the investigator—and possibly the investigator’s 
institution—of all current federal funding, and denial of future 
funding by the sponsoring agency.83 
Like methods of restricting data, which curtail the usefulness of 
the information made available, methods of restricting access also 
impose certain costs on the investigator. Gaining access to 
confidential data may involve inconvenience, delay, and financial 
costs, since remote access modalities as well as research data 
centers require the payment of a fee to defray the expense of 
maintaining the service or facility. In an effort to provide better 
access to such data, the Panel on Data Access for Research 
Purposes has proposed a number of recommendations designed to 
improve methods of restricting data, on the one hand, and of 
facilitating restricted access to detailed confidential data, on the 
other. For example, with respect to access, the panel has 
recommended that the Census Bureau broaden the interpretation of 
the criteria used to give researchers access to its confidential 
data;84 that the statistical agencies sponsor research on cost-
effective means of providing secure access through remote data 
access mechanisms;85 that the use of licensing agreements for 
confidential data be expanded;86 and that such agreements include 
provision for auditing compliance to security procedures and 
penalties for their violation.87 With respect to improving methods 
of restricting data to limit its identifiability, the panel has 
recommended that agencies responsible for data collection should 
sponsor or conduct research on (1) developing measures for 
quantifying disclosure risk; (2) estimating the effect on disclosure 
risk of adding selected variables from confidential files to public 
use files; (3) estimating and improving the utility-disclosure 
limitation tradeoffs of alternative disclosure limitation methods, 
including synthetic data; and (4) developing disclosure limitation 
                                                          
83 For further discussion of restricted access modes, see PANEL ON DATA 
ACCESS, supra note 1, at 31. 
84 Id. at 77 (Recommendation 9). 
85 Id. at 78 (Recommendation 10). 
86 Id. at 79 (Recommendation 11). 
87 Id. at 80 (Recommendation 13). 
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methods for establishment (business) data.88 
CONCLUSION 
This article has tried to communicate a number of points. First, 
there is an inherent tension between providing easy access to 
research data and protecting the confidentiality of those data. 
Second, increasingly, the courts will be called on to adjudicate the 
competing claims of those who want broader access, and those 
who want greater protection for privacy and confidentiality. Some 
of these claims may involve questions of national security, which 
will only complicate matters further. Third, a democratic society 
demands wide access to high-quality research data, but good data 
require the public’s continued willingness to provide information, 
and to do so honestly and accurately. Fourth, such cooperation, in 
turn, depends on the public’s confidence that their privacy and 
confidentiality will be respected and that they will not be harmed 
as a result of their voluntary cooperation in research. Finally, 
managing the tension between access to research data and 
protecting the confidentiality of those data requires recourse to 
technical, administrative, and legal solutions, some of them not yet 
invented. But even with the tools we have now, it is possible to do 
a great deal, if not everything, to satisfy both sides of the 
controversy. 
 
                                                          
88 Id. at 72 (Recommendation 5). 
